

Message Text

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ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-08 IO-04 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01

INR-05 L-01 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02

SS-15 USIA-06 /064 W

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R 261223Z OCT 74

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5148

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY BERN

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 14027

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, PORG, UN, CB, BM, UK

SUBJECT: KHMER IN THE 29TH UNGA: BURMA

REF: (A) STATE 232799 (NOTAL) (B) STATE 235060

SUMMARY. WE MADE SOUNDING OF FCO ON POSSIBLE DEMARCHE BY LORD MOUNTBATTEN TO NE WIN ON CAMBODIA RESOLUTION IN UNGA. SENIOR FCO OFFICIAL DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT APPROACH WOULD WORK AND FEARS THAT FCO EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT IDEA MIGHT RESULT IN CONSTRAINTS ON OTHER UK ACTIVITIES IN

SUPPORT OF GKR. END SUMMARY.

1. ON OCTOBER 25, WE EXPLORED HMG ATTITUDE ON POSSIBLE APPROACH TO NE WIN BY LORD MOUNTBATTEN ON KHMER ISSUE IN UNGA WITH SQUIRE, HEAD OF FCO SOUTHEAST ASIA DEPARTMENT.

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WE MADE ALL POINTS IN REF (A) AND IN PARA 5 REF (B). WE

ALSO ADVISED HIM THAT DEPARTMENT INTENDS HAVE SIMILAR DISCUSSION WITH UK EMBASSY WASHINGTON.

2. SQUIRE SAID HE DOES NOT BELIEVE NE WIN IS IN UK AT PRESENT BUT HE WILL CHECK ON THIS POINT. SPEAKING TO SUBSTANCE OF U.S. PROPOSAL, HE SAID THAT WHENEVER THERE IS BAD NEWS TO DELIVER TO NE WIN, HMG ASKS LORD MOUNTBATTEN TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE. NE WIN TAKES SUCH NEWS BETTER FROM MOUNTBATTEN THAN FROM ANY OTHER ENGLISHMAN. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF RESPECT BETWEEN THE TWO. BUT IN THE PAST, WHENEVER MOUNTBATTEN HAS RECOMMENDED THAT NE WIN CHANGE HIS MIND ON A POLICY, NE WIN HAS INVARIABLY NOT FOLLOWED MOUNTBATTEN'S ADVICE. BASED ON HIS OWN PERSONAL OBSERVATION OF THE TWO TOGETHER, SQUIRE BELIEVES

PROPOSED APPROACH WOULD NOT WORK.

3. SQUIRE NOTED THAT UK HAS BEEN ABLE TO GIVE MORE SUPPORT TO GKR IN 29TH UNGA THAN IN PAST (CO-SPONSORSHIP, EXTENSIVE LOBBYING, ETC.) AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE SOUTH-EAST ASIA IS NOT ONE OF HIGHEST PRIORITY FOREIGN POLICY ITEMS FOR HMG. THIS MEANS THAT WHILE THE GENERAL POLICY HAS THE BLESSING OF MINISTERS, OFFICIALS HAVE ENJOYED A GREAT DEAL OF FLEXIBILITY IN TAKING ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF GKR. MOUNTBATTEN PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE LETTER SIGNED BY THE FOREIGN SECRETARY HIMSELF. THIS WOULD CAUSE FOREIGN SECRETARY TO BECOME INVOLVED WITH DETAILS FOR FIRST TIME AND WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD LIMIT FUTURE FREEDOM OF ACTION BY FCO AS GKR ISSUE COMES CLOSER TO VOTING.

4. SECONDLY, MOUNTBATTEN PROPOSAL MIGHT BE VIEWED AS OPENING THE DOOR TO MAKING THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE INTO A DOMESTIC ISSUE IN UK. THIS WOULD BE FURTHER HINDRANCE TO CONTINUATION OF POSITIVE UK POLICY IN SUPPORT OF GKR BECAUSE PARTS OF THE LABOR PARTY PROBABLY WOULD AGITATE

AGAINST SUPPORT OF GKR. WHILE THIS WOULD NOT CHANGE UK POLICY, IT WOULD MAKE IT HARDER TO GIVE ALL-OUT SUPPORT.

5. DESPITE THE PROBLEMS DESCRIBED IN PARAS 3 AND 4,
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SQUIRE WOULD NOT HESITATE TO PROCEED WITH THE MOUNTBATTEN PROPOSAL IF HE THOUGHT IT WOULD WORK. BUT HE BELIEVES IT WILL NOT WORK AND THAT VALUABLE CAPITAL WITH HIS MINISTERS WOULD BE EXPENDED FOR NO RESULT.

6. SQUIRE WILL DISCUSS THE PROPOSAL WITHIN HIS DEPARTMENT AND WITH HIS UNDERSECRETARY (MICHAEL WILFORD) BUT HE WILL NOT GIVE US A MORE FORMAL RESPONSE UNLESS WE ASK AGAIN.

WE NOTE THAT HE HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY HELPFUL TO US IN WORKING FOR SUPPORT BY UK OF U.S. POLICIES TOWARD SOUTH-EAST ASIA IN THE PAST. WE BELIEVE THAT HIS ANALYSIS OF THE OUTCOME OF A MOUNTBATTEN APPROACH IS CORRECT. WE WILL, HOWEVER, RAISE ISSUE WITH HIM AGAIN NEXT WEEK TO LEARN OUTCOME OF INTRA-FCO CONSIDERATION UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE. ANNENBERG.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: CREDENTIALS PRESENTATION, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, UNGA RESOLUTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 26 OCT 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: shawdg
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974LONDON14027
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740306-0886
From: LONDON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741013/aaaaakws.tel
Line Count: 122
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) STATE 232799 (NOTAL) (B) STATE 2, 35060
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: shawdg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 18 JUN 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <18 JUN 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <12 MAR 2003 by shawdg>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KHMER IN THE 29TH UNGA: BURMA
TAGS: PFOR, PORG, CB, BM, UK, UN
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005